



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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


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
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POLAND: Continuing the Dialogue

*The Jaruzelski regime apparently will continue its dialogue with Solidarity despite its harsh condemnation of the general strike yesterday.* [redacted]

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At the Central Committee session yesterday, Jaruzelski called on Solidarity to give up its "festering merry-go-round" of strikes and to engage in "constructive cooperation." While the union was preparing to strike, government officials met with one of union leader Walesa's closest advisers to plan the next round of union-government talks. Walesa is expected to meet with Jaruzelski within a week. [redacted]

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Jaruzelski also announced his intention to propose to parliament this Friday a framework for "social consultations," something that could lead to more formal structuring of union-government relations. It is unclear how far the proposal will go toward meeting Solidarity's demands. A union official said that Solidarity will push for creation of a body to oversee economic reform and coordinate economic preparations for winter. [redacted]

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Party personnel changes announced yesterday do not appear to signal any major change of Jaruzelski's "firm but moderate" course. The Central Committee also approved the Politburo's recommendation that Jaruzelski retain all three of his top posts. [redacted]

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The appointment of a close Jaruzelski associate, General Siwicki, brings to three the number of generals on the Politburo. Two civilians, who are political unknowns, were brought into the Central Committee Secretariat; one may be a moderate. Three Central Committee departments were merged into a single entity to oversee the nonagricultural part of the economy. [redacted]

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Solidarity's one-hour strike yesterday passed without incident and provided a successful show of union strength. Although the leadership is no doubt gratified over the results, it is still concerned about the increasing lack of discipline among local chapters. Even though one local union suspended its planned continuation of the one-hour strike, work stoppages that had already been under way elsewhere apparently are continuing. The National Commission will meet next week to address the issue of union discipline and wildcat strikes. [redacted]

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USSR-CHINA: Status of Relations

*Moscow reportedly is sending its senior expert on China to Beijing today for exploratory talks on the border dispute and possibly other issues.* [redacted]

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The Soviets still give no sign of a willingness to meet the Chinese halfway on any aspect of the border dispute. Moscow's initiative may thus be designed more to encourage Beijing to take a less anti-Soviet course, than presented in the expectation of any immediate progress toward resolving the border dispute. [redacted]

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In addition, the initiative may be aimed at the US and other third parties to remind them they cannot count on a continued Sino-Soviet split. Despite its deep hostility toward the USSR, China also could decide to use a resumption in border talks to demonstrate that it has other options if Sino-US relations deteriorate.

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CHAD: Tensions and Coup Rumors in N'Djamena

*N'Djamena is rife with rumors of an impending confrontation between forces of President Goukouni and troops loyal to pro-Libyan Foreign Minister Acyl which sketchy official reports seem to downplay.* [redacted]

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According to unconfirmed French press reports, Acyl's followers entered N'Djamena yesterday in force. Libya is reported to have airlifted additional armored units to the city Tuesday night and presumably has reinforced key positions. Libya's second-in-command, Major Jaloud, is also said to be in the Chadian capital. [redacted]

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[redacted]

while tensions have increased in the Chadian capital, no imminent showdown is under way. If matters do come to a head, it may be that Acyl and the Libyans have caught wind of Goukouni's appeal last week for Western military aid and an OAU peacekeeping force to forestall a possible pro-Libyan power grab. The Foreign Minister has long wanted to seize power, and the Libyans would see him as a more cooperative Chadian head of state. [redacted]

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Goukouni's small armed following--supported by another Muslim faction opposed to Tripoli's military presence in Chad--would almost certainly resist a power shift. They would have virtually no chance, however, of fending off a Libyan-backed move by Acyl without help from Chadian Vice President Kamougue and his southern non-Muslim faction, which probably would try to stay out of the fray. [redacted]

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If Acyl does oust Goukouni, Libya will be in a strong position to effect a political merger with Chad. Kamougue and other southern leaders oppose such a union, which could prompt southern Chad to formally secede from the Muslim north and appeal to France for military and economic aid. [redacted]

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FINLAND-USSR: Soviet Concerns

*President Kekkonen's decision to resign will introduce an element of uncertainty into what in recent years has been one of Moscow's most stable foreign policy relationships in Western Europe.*

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Soviet officials have given discreet indications of their concern over who will succeed Kekkonen. Social Democratic Prime Minister Koivisto, who enjoys an overwhelming lead in presidential preference polls, may appear too independent for the Soviets. Moscow prefers someone like Ahti Karjalainen, who has established close relationships with several Soviet leaders and is comfortable with the existing bilateral relationship.

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The Soviets appear to be aware that blatant efforts to influence the choice of president could easily backfire. They will not hesitate to exert their influence, however, if they suspect that ties with Helsinki would be weakened.

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Koivisto's opponents have yet to reach agreement on an eventual consensus candidate. None of the candidates likely to be put forward for the presidential election next January will advocate any fundamental departures from Finland's policy of remaining outside great power conflicts or making certain accommodations to Soviet security interests. The various candidates, realizing that Soviet sensitivities probably were heightened by both the Conservative election victory in Norway and the recent visit by Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Sweden, are likely to deal cautiously with any issues that may be seen in Moscow as threatening.

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SPAIN: Communist Party's Troubles

*The troubles encountered by the Communist Party in its regional branches probably will erode further the party's strength in the next national election, which could be held early next year.* [redacted]

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In the election last week of the Galician regional assembly, the Communists received less than 3 percent of the vote and won no seats, while two other parties on the far left won nearly 10 percent and four seats. Although the vote does not necessarily signify a national trend, the loss of one-third of the vote the party won in Galicia in the national election in 1979 will worry the national leadership. [redacted]

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The debacle in Galicia was followed by a public display of dissension between national leaders and the Basque regional party. The Basques are refusing to obey instructions to refrain from joining a leftist Basque nationalist coalition. [redacted]

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The national secretariat has ordered the dissolution of the Basque party's central committee and the election of a new committee, but the Basque Secretary General asserts he will not comply. Such defiance is likely to encourage greater independence among other regional parties--particularly the Catalan, which has caused the national leadership considerable trouble in the past. [redacted]

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Party leader Carrillo managed to impose his views and resist reform efforts at the party congress in July, but he probably will be unable to mend the cracks in the party or retain in the next election the 11 percent of the vote the Communists won in 1979. Although party members generally agree with Carrillo's Eurocommunist views, they dislike his autocratic style. As long as he remains at the helm, the Communists are likely to continue to decline as a force in national politics. [redacted]

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ANGOLA: Factional Dispute

*Differences in the ruling party over how to deal with Jonas Savimbi's South African - backed insurgency have sharpened.*

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Leaders of the "Catete group," a black nationalist faction in the party, reportedly have voiced interest in seeing the government open negotiations with Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The nationalists are becoming increasingly concerned over the disruptive impact on the economy of the fighting and of South African military incursions.

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The mulatto-led faction that dominates the regime remains opposed to any negotiations with Savimbi aimed at bringing him or other top UNITA leaders into the government. This faction is more dogmatically Marxist and pro-Soviet than the nationalists and appears to be solidly backed by Moscow and Havana.

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President dos Santos--a black who is aligned with the mulatto-led group--seems interested in a rapprochement with UNITA. Neither he nor others who favor such a policy, however, appear to have enough support in the party and armed forces to move in that direction.

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Savimbi has been encouraged by the growing factional strife in the government, by popular discontent resulting from the country's economic problems, and by the US administration's efforts to obtain repeal of the Clark Amendment barring aid to Angolan insurgents. Although guerrilla operations have increased somewhat, UNITA has failed to expand significantly its areas of influence outside southern Angola, its main area of ethnic support. South Africa continues to provide aid to UNITA, but assistance from other sources has fallen off.

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ALBANIA: Pressure for Increased Western Trade

Some members of the leadership may urge increased trade with the West at the party congress next week, but proponents of self-reliance probably will resist abandoning the country's isolationism. A recent article in the party ideological journal admitted that Western technology is essential to modernize industry and improve the quality of manufactured goods. Although the article reaffirmed Albania's policy of refusing any foreign credits or economic aid, the call for increased trade probably reflects the views of those in the leadership who want a more pragmatic approach toward economic planning.

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The current draft five-year plan calls for a doubling of foreign trade, and disagreement over this issue may be the reason that passage of the plan is almost a year behind schedule. Tirane has already experienced difficulties this year in finding resources to acquire capital goods from the West. Albania's ability to deal with Western firms will remain questionable as long as the constitutional prohibition against foreign credits is in effect.

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